BRIEF ON IRAN Representative Office of The National Council of Resistance of Iran No. 342 Monday, February 5, 1996 3421 M Street NW #1032, Washington, DC 20007 Terror Threats in Riyadh, New York Times, February 2 Americans in Saudi Arabia have been warned of the threat of terrorist attacks aimed at them, State Department officials said today. The warning originated with flashes of Islamic fundamentalist anger detected in recent days by United States intelligence agencies. Their sources included promises of retribution for the recent terrorism conviction of an Egyptian sheikh in a New York courtroom; the reaction by Iran's leaders to reports of a covert plan aimed at them by the United States, and tensions between the Saudi Arabian government and its internal enemies... There were other stirrings in the region today [Feb. 1]. Bahrain ordered an Iranian diplomat to leave the tiny Persian Gulf nation for "activities unrelated to his diplomatic work," a phrase that usually connects acts of espionage or political troublemaking. United States officials said they suspected that Iran, or anti-American groups and individuals it supports, might be behind the rising fundamentalist rage that has been reported.... The Party of God issued a statement two weeks ago in Tehran, The Iranian capital, "condemning recent U.S. moves against the Islamic Republic of Iran." It said it would "rub the nose of the United States in the dust of degradation" and "crush its face with a firm blow." FEATURE Parliamentary Elections Aggravate Schism At The Top On Jan. 27, Rafsanjani and his cabinet met Khamenei to find a solution to what Rafsanjani had described as "a schism" in the ruling clique. The rift became public on January 18 when 16 members of Rafsanjani's cabinet signed a statement in support of Rafsanjani. The statement in question, signed by 10 of the 24 government ministers, called on the regime's operatives to vote for candidates in the parliamentary elections who would support Rafsanjani and his economic policies. However, the most important ministers, including the foreign, the intelligence, the interior and the oil ministers, did not endorse the statement, indicating that the cleavage caused by Rafsanjani in the so-called Militant Clergy Association has backfired. Ressalat wrote in this regard: "The most cohesive government after the revolution suffered a split in ranks." A parliament deputy echoed the same theme: "Within and without Iran they say Rafsanjani's government has lost its cohesiveness." The reason for issuing the statement in the first place was that Rafsanjani had failed to include five candidates of his choice in the 30-member slate fielded by the militant clergy. The action enraged the rival faction. Two days later, 150 parliament deputies published a letter lashing out at Rafsanjani. Movahedi Savoji, an MP closely linked with Khamenei, publicly warned Rafsanjani that they may put "his incompetence" to vote and that they may bring up an interpellation against the cabinet ministers. That less than half the ministers signed the statement displays Rafsanjani's fragile standing. Since the statement was made public and after warnings by Khamenei, 10 signatories indicated that they were going to withdraw their signatures. The recent rift however must be seen beyond a split between Rafsanjani and his opponents. After Khomeini's death, the warring factions have gradually devoured each other. During the fourth Majlis elections in 1991, a coalition consisting of pro-Rafsanjani and pro- Khamenei currents purged the rival faction, the so-called Imam's line, from the reigns of power. Not even one member of that group was elected to the parliament. This time, it appears that Khamenei's supporters are trying to pull the rug from under Rafsanjani's feet. To ensure the election of their faction's candidates, the interior minister Besharati, a staunch pro-Khamenei figure, has already replaced some 160 local and state governors as well as other pro-Rafsanjani politicians prompting a loud protest by the lame-duck president. But, Rafsanjani is not the only senior official having problems. The regime's supreme leader Khamenei lacks any religious authority among the traditional clergy. During his much publicized visit to Qom, the seat of the mullahs' power, he was shunned by all senior clergy who teach in various Qom seminaries. A few weeks ago, his most fervent promoter, mullah Ahmad Azari Qomi, issued a 28-page letter, rejecting Khamenei's claims to be the Marja' (the source of emulation). He also lambasted Rafsanjani and blamed the Majlis for the multitudes of acute problems confronting the regime. Whatever the outcome of the parliamentary election farce, nothing will change as far as the mullahs' suppressive domestic and the aggressive foreign policies are concerned. One thing is certain, however. The election sham in March, as illegitimate as it is, will not reverse the clerics' demise; it will only aggravate it.