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CHAPTER I

5. Letter by an Iranian engineer to President Clinton, 18 October, 1994. She wrote in her letter to the President, “Having presented my thoughts and observations I found that Mr. Henzel remained unprepared to reconsider his initial views on the People’s Mojahedin of Iran.”
8. Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Previous State Department reports have also referred to this book. Abrahamian’s main source of information on the Mojahedin was Torab Hagshenas and his wife Pooran Bazargan. The two are former members of a now defunct ultra-left Marxist group that murdered several Mojahedin members and shattered the Mojahedin organization in the 1970s. Abrahamian calls himself a democratic socialist by political preference. For a discussion of the author’s stance on issues regarding Iran see chapter IV.
10. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. ii.
12. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. iii.
15. Kayhan Havai, Tehran, 5 May 1994. This weekly is associated with the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and published for Iranians living abroad.
Notes

19. The Mojahedin response to the article was distributed on Capitol Hill as a “Dear Colleague” letter by Reps. Ronald V. Dellums, Helen D. Bentley and James A. Traficant in October 1994.
21. For more details see chapter VII.
23. Ibid., p. 13.
26. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 16.
31. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 16.
32. Ibid.
34. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 10.
35. Ibid.
36. Reuters, dispatch from Damascus, 29 March 1991. Farzin Hashemi, then London spokesman for the Mojahedin, denied reports by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and told Reuters that “the Mojahedin are not engaged in any fighting with the Kurdish insurgents... the PUK allegations are totally false. We have no interest in getting involved in Iraq’s internal affairs or in a war with anybody other than the Khomeini regime.” Also, Jonathan C. Randal, “Army Offensive Repelled, Iraqi Opposition Says,” The Washington Post, 19 March 1991. “Alireza Jafarzadeh, then the Mojahedin’s press spokesman in Washington, also denied allegations by Kurdish sources in Damascus that Mojahedin guerrillas were fighting alongside Iraqi government troops against the Iraqi opposition. The Mojahedin ‘has nothing to do with the internal situation in Iraq,’ Jafarzadeh said.”; In a dispatch from Zakho, Iraq, on 26 March 1991, Associated Press reported the same denials.
37. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 10.
38. Tehran radio, 12 April 1991. Hashemi-Rafsanjani acknowledged that the regime’s forces had crossed the border, adding, “It is not our responsibility to safeguard our 1,300 km border with Iraq... it is possible that some people did go... to the other side, did some things and came back ”
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41. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. ii.
42. Ibid.
43. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 19.
44. NCR Statement, 16 September 1993.
46. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
47. Ibid., p. 19
48. Mojahed, special issue, fall 1991; NLA Journal, November 1991. Mojahed published the names of the Central Council members and offered explanation on the election process. NLA Journal published a report on the Central Council meeting in which Mrs. Rajavi, the Mojahedin Secretary-General at the time, said, "Another point to note is the manner in which the Central Council members are elected and the criteria used to determine their competence. Members of the Central Council were unanimously nominated for membership by the Mojahedin members working in their section." According to the report, Mrs. Fereshteh Yeganeh, the Mojahedin Organizational Supervisor, introduced the names of 54 candidates to the Central Council nominated by their colleagues in the various departments and sections. After extensive deliberations, their membership was put to the ballot.
50. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 7.
52. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 13.
53. Ibid., p. 23.
54. Ibid., p. 18.
56. KDF Politburo’s letter to the Mojahedin, 13 March 1987. It reads, “Our dear homeland’s precarious state requires as never before cooperation among all republican opposition organizations struggling for the regime’s overthrow. Therefore, we propose a meeting at the leadership level between the two of us to discuss and exchange views on relations between the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. We await your suggestion as to the time and place of the meeting.” (For a copy of the original letter see Appendix B.)
57. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 7.
60. Enqelab Islami, No. 48, 1 April 1983, published by Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. (See Appendix B.)
63. NCR Statement, Mojahed, No. 198, 13 April 1984.
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64. Bani-Sadr’s letter to Khomeini, Mojahed, No. 216, 17 August 1984. (See Appendix B.)
65. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 6.
68. Ibid., p. 4.
69. Ibid.
70. A document entitled, “The Assassinations of 28 August 1976: A Case Study,” is accompanied by a map of the location of the incident and a detailed analysis. There are three parts to the report: Part I - The Incident and Its Aftermath; Part II - Threat Analysis; Part III - Security Lessons.
71. See Appendix G.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. U.S. State Department, op. cit., Wendy Sherman’s letter accompanying the report.

CHAPTER II

1. U.S. Congress, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Section 523. In the course of the January 1994 Senate deliberations on the Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced an amendment, containing baseless accusations against the Mojahedin. The action enjoyed the State Department’s tacit approval. The Senate adopted the McCain amendment by unanimous consent, thereby avoiding a vote. The issue faced strong opposition in the Congress and eventually the conference committee eliminated all of the allegations. Members of Congress stressed that they want an objective report.
2. Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 10 June 1994. (See Appendix C.)
6. Letter by 98 members of the U.S. House of Representatives to Secretary of State, 9 September 1994. Many members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, committee and subcommittee chairmen and a number of ranking Republicans in different committees endorsed the letter. It represented a broad spectrum of congressional viewpoint. (See Appendix C.)
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Press release by Congressman Gary Ackerman, 21 September 1994. (See
Notes

25. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
37. Letter to President Clinton by British parliamentarians, 20 October 1994. Mr. Cynog Dafis, MP, sent the petition along with a letter to President Clinton on 27 October.
38. Lord Avebury, letter to President Clinton, 18 October 1994. (See Appendix C.)
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40. Lennart Friden, conservative member of Swedish Parliament, letter to President Clinton, 26 October 1994.
42. Letter by an Iranian-American to President Clinton, 18 October 1994.

CHAPTER III

8. Statement by Senator Durenberger, 2 November 1994. (See Appendix C.)
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
16. Marvin Zonis, WBEZ Radio, Chicago, 15 November 1994. Dr. Zonis, Professor of International Political Economy, University of Chicago, is a leading Iran expert who has followed events in that country for the last 30 years. His name appears in the State Department report as a source of information.
17. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Charley Reese, "The Clinton administration foreign policy is muddled-take
a look,” The Orlando Sentinel, 29 November 1994.


26. Resolution of the 9 November worldwide demonstrations by Iranians abroad to protest the Khomeini regime’s missile attack on a National Liberation Army base. Subsequently, copies were delivered to the White House and sent to other government officials.

CHAPTER IV


3. Simultaneous with the Iranagate affair in the U.S. in mid 1985, France, too, sought to free its hostages in Lebanon, held by the Khomeini sponsored Hezbollah. In doing so, the French began to bring increasing pressure to bear on the NCR president who had taken up residence near Paris. In 1986, the NCR President left France. The mullahs had reached their goal and found a French soft spot. They demanded that France free one of their terrorists (Enis Nagash), imprisoned in France since 1980. To prove that it meant business, the Iranian regime sponsored a wave of bombings in Paris that killed 13 French citizens and injured many more. Vahid Gorji, an Iranian embassy translator and the mastermind of the terrorist operation, was sought by the police for the attacks. Gorji went into hiding in the Iranian embassy. In a political standoff, the French again backed off and Gorji left France without facing any trial.

4. Reuters, dispatch from Tehran, 22 June 1994; “Iran accused unnamed foreign countries on Wednesday of backing the Iraq-based opposition Mujahideen Khalq blamed by Tehran for a bomb that blew up on Monday in the golden-domed shrine of Imam Reza in the northeastern city of Mashad. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati called the diplomatic corps to his ministry to deliver the charge... Velayati produced no evidence but said investigations and documents confirmed that the bombing was ‘engineered and carried out by the Monafeqin terrorist grouplet [Mojahedin]...’ He urged the diplomats to denounce the bombing and reiterated Iran’s long-standing demand that they curb Mujahideen activities in their countries.”


7. The Tehran murder machine (London: British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 2 March 1994). This report is the result of a study on the terrorism of the Iranian regime against dissidents. It lists more than 100 cases of terrorist
attempts against dissidents abroad. The report’s introduction says in part: “For centuries, it has been a principle of international law that political opponents of an autocratic state could seek and obtain protection from their oppressors abroad. In the twentieth century, the victims of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Pinochet, Pol Pot, Suharto, Ceausescu, Stroessner and Ne Win, all found safety and asylum in other countries, where they were immune from persecution. Now for the first time, a dictatorship is reaching out its tentacles into the free world, to hunt down and kill its opponents living in exile.” The report analyzes the roots of terrorism which emanates from the doctrine of velayat-e-faqih (guardianship of religious jurisprudent), on which the regime is based. It also elaborates on how the murder machine works. Politically, the report concludes, the indecisiveness of the West vis-a-vis the Iranian regime has encouraged it to believe it will suffer no real penalties for the export of terrorism. As examples, the report cites Europeans’ greed for short term economic interests and U.S.’s involvement in the Iran-gate affair by agreeing to sell arms to the regime and to lash out at the democratic Mojahedin opposition.

Senator McCain’s actions, against the Iranian Resistance dates back to late 1992, when he wrote a series of letters on the Mojahedin to government officials. He specifically pressured the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to release a report against the Mojahedin. He wrote a letter on 15 December 1992 to then FBI Director William Sessions and enclosed a series of unfounded allegations against the Mojahedin claiming that they were part of an FBI report dating back to 1987 and urged the FBI to update it. Not only did the FBI refuse to issue a new report, but John Collingwood, Inspector in Charge, from the Office of Public and Congressional Affairs, also replied: “A review of our files indicates that the enclosed report was not prepared by the FBI.” (Congressional Record, Senate, 29 June 1993, pp. SB261-6.)

Subsequently, in his letter of 9 June 1993, Senator McCain harshly criticized the FBI Director. Whatever Senator McCain’s motives, his enmity toward the Mojahedin and NCR can only be explained in the context of his views about the mullahs’ regime. In 1984, as a House member, he wrote to NCR President Massoud Rajavi:

“I am writing to express support for the goals for which you are striving: a peaceful and democratic Iran. For almost five years, the people of Iran have suffered under the yoke of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini is responsible for the death of thousands of Iranians. His regime has systematically denied basic human rights to the Iranian people. The efforts of the National Council of Resistance to end the brutality in Iran are truly laudable, and I commend you and your compatriots for the courage shown in your endeavor. The hopes of all Americans for a better Iran are with you.” (For a reprint of McCain’s letter to Mr. Rajavi, see Appendix G.)

In 1993, McCain believes: “Iran does preserve some elements of democracy and the rule of law, and allowed its citizens more commercial freedom than Iraq.” He adds: “There are some indicators that a policy of encouraging normal civilian trade and diplomatic relations could encourage these positive trends.”
13. Ibid.
15. Kayhan Havai, Tehran, 2 November 1994. (See Appendix E.)
16. Ibid.
18. IRNA, dispatch from Tehran, 5 November 1994. (See Appendix E.)
22. IRNA, dispatch from Tehran, 5 November 1994.
25. Jomhouri Islami, Tehran, 3 November 1994. (See Appendix E.)
30. Associated Press, dispatch from Nicosia, 9 November 1994. The report emphasizes that "the base lies just within the no-fly zone.”
31. Hamid Assefi, the Khomeini regime’s ambassador to France, letter to the Judge in the Bakhhtiar murder trial, 28 November 1994.
34. Mojahedin statements, op. cit.
35. See Appendix F.
37. See Appendix F.
38. Bijan Sepasy, letter to a concerned Iranian patriot, 1994. (See Appendix F.)
39. Ibid.
40. A former member of Bani-Sadr’s office when he was still the President, Nasser Khajenouri is an agent of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. He has been very active in disseminating anti-Mojahedin propaganda in Washington’s political circles.
Notes

41. Statement by the Press Office of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran, Paris, 9
December 1994.
42. Shahin Gobadi, Mojahedin press spokesman in Washington, wrote a letter to
the foreign editor of The Wall Street Journal on 1 October 1994. In his October
3 reply, the Journal’s Foreign Editor confirmed receiving Gobadi’s letter.
44. Gary Sick, “How Iran is becoming The Gulf’s Superpower,” The Washington
Post, 18 May 1986.
46. Gary Sick, interview with the CBS morning news, CBS Television network,
10 June 1988.
49. Gary Sick, interview with the NBC morning news, NBC Television network,
30 August 1988.
November 1994.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. James Bill, “The United State and Iran: Mutual mythologies,” Middle East
56. Ibid.
57. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomenism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993), p. 3.
58. Ibid.
60. Patrick Clawson, Iran’s Challenge to the West: How, When, and Why, The
63. Joshua Muravchik, “An Alternative to Islamic Fundamentalism?,”
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

CHAPTER V

1. “Developments in the Middle East,” hearing before the Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th
3. Tapely Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental
Notes

6. Ressaalat, Tehran, 20 July 1987. (See Appendix E.)
7. See Appendix D.
8. In an editorial, “Paying Khomeini’s Price,” The Boston Globe, 25 April 1987, wrote: “President Reagan’s secret arms sales to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini engendered not only a domestic crisis, altering the image of Reagan as a strong leader, but also a distortion of US foreign policy... As documented in appendix B of the Tower Commission report, the Reagan administration tried to placate Khomeini not only with missiles and battlefield-intelligence data, but also by taking measures against Khomeini’s principal domestic opponent, the resistance organization known as the People’s Mujahedeen.” Also in their column, “The Real Iranian Terrorist,” The Washington Post, 3 April 1987, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak noted: “While Israel and the United States were selling arms to Iran behind the backs of Congress and the world, the State Department was quietly trash[ing] the first effective anti-Khomeini opposition in Iran, called the People’s Mojahedeen, as ‘anti-democratic, anti-American’ and using ‘terrorism’.” (See Appendix D.)
9. Congressman Mervyn M. Dymally, letter to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 12 March 1987. (See Appendix D.)
11. Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy, hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 21 April 1987. (See Appendix D.)
16. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 19 September 1989.
17. Congressman Mervyn M. Dymally, letter to Secretary of State James Baker, 3 October 1989. (See Appendix D.)
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24. Agence France Presse, dispatch from Paris, 26 October 1994. Titled "Mr. Christopher’s Call on U.S. Allies Has a Poor Chance of Being Heard," AFP described Christopher’s demand for "a firm stance vis-a-vis Tehran" as "absurd" because the U.S. "is one of the few industrial countries whose trade with the Islamic Republic has increased in 1993."

CHAPTER VI

1. Shariat-Razavi, Qandchi and Bozorgnia were three Tehran University students, shot dead in a peaceful demonstration on campus by the Shah’s security forces on 7 December 1953. Vice President Nixon arrived in Tehran for an official visit the same day.
3. Ibid., p. 76.
6. Mohammad Hanifnejad, the founder of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran, was an agricultural engineer and Muslim intellectual. Born in 1938 in Tabriz, capital of Eastern Azerbaijan Province, he was an activist in the anti-Shah struggle. Jailed in 1963, he met Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Taleqani, an anti-Shah, anti-fundamentalist religious leader. Years later Ayatollah Taleqani said of him: "I taught him how to learn from the Quran, and he discovered its meaning."
7. Chegouneh Quran Biamouzim?, (How to Study the Quran, the Mojahedin’s guidelines on how to study and interpret the Quran,) People’s Mojahedin of Iran: Tehran, spring 1979, Vol. I, p. 9: "For numerous reasons, our organization emphasized using the original Islamic texts in its ideological studies, particularly the Quran and Nahj-ol Balagheh (The Road to Eloquence, a compilation of sermons, letters, and sayings of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first Shi’ite Imam). This approach was totally different from the traditional methods. At the same time, the organization felt it must have a realistic and scientific approach to such studies... Through the Mojahedin, Islam was presented in a different manner..."
8. Mojahed, No. 82, 7 June 1980, pp. 6-7, excerpts of a series of articles analyzing the shah’s suppression of the 5 June 1963 demonstrations: "The bloody and brutal suppression of the June 5 demonstrations purged the wavering forces incapable of continuing the struggle at a higher level. Many of the ‘leaders’ backed off. Rationalizing that ‘it is no use to continue the struggle,’ or ‘nothing can be done for now,’ they succumbed to the shah, kept quiet and vacated the
scene. This defeat disappointed the nation, which lost trust in political leaders...
On the other hand, there were selfless pioneers who built the foundations of
future victories on the ruins of past defeats.”

9 Tahlil-e Amouzeshi-ye Bayaniye-e Appointist-haye Chapnama (Educational
Analyses of the Statement of the pseudo-Leftist Opportunists), (People’s
Mojahedin of Iran: spring 1979), pp. 170-246: “The opportunists designated
certain persons to spy on those individuals whom they believed had not
completely succumbed to their ideology or were resistant... In the case of Majid
(Sharif Vajefi), they designated his wife. One of our most talented sisters, she
had begun to waver under the pressure of the opportunists, and for this reason,
had been forced, as punishment, to labor in a factory... Five days after she
gave them a report, she and Majid went for a rendezvous [with the opportunist
leaders]; it was Majid’s last. First the opportunists separated her from Majid
and sent her away. Then Majid was led to the slaughter, and his body
subsequently burned.”

10 Ibid., pp. 237-239. “In the midst of ideological conflicts within the organization,
circumstances in which all principled leaders make correct, realistic conduct
a first priority, the opportunist leadership of the ideologically transformed
organization launched several military operations (the assassinations of Col.
Zandipour, the American colonels, etc.)...
The survival of the organization as a single entity was in question, due to
massive purges and a demoralized membership, but [the opportunist
leadership] had the organization take on the burden of major military
operations. These were undertaken in a bid to clamp a lid on the conflicts
brewing within, and enabled the opportunists to challenge the genuine
[Muslim] Mojahedin from a position of strength. Though the operations used
the tactical and technical resources of the genuine Mojahedin and the
experience of its members, they served the interests of the opportunist leaders,
consolidating their base of power. By the same token, they were able to use
the prestige of the military operations to muster credibility for their new
opportunist positions. To this end, the leaflets they distributed on the
assassination of Col. Zandipour carried the original emblem of the Mojahedin
with a doctored Quranic verse, so that the public would be prepared for the
announcement of the change of the organization’s ideology to Marxism....
“Only a month or so following the assassination of Zandipour, the leaflets
on the assassination of the American colonels were distributed with an emblem
which lacked the Quranic verse. In this way, every one became aware of the
changes within the Mojahedin. The opportunist leaders could more easily
silence the resistant members of lower rank, and at the same time counter
other forces from a position of strength and pave the way for their publicizing
of the opportunist changes.”

11 How to Study the Quran, op. cit., pp. 10-11: “The opportunist, treacherous
blow to the Mojahedin Organization by the leftist opportunists did irreversible
damage to our nation’s liberation movement. The organization’s ideology
suffered the worst blow. On the one hand, it damaged the hope and trust of
our people in the organization and on the other, created suitable grounds for
the emergence of a reactionary rightist current. Overall, it brought about and set in motion a 'rightist threat' within the movement."

12. For more information on Massoud Rajavi see chapter XII.

13. Educational Analyses of the Statement of the pseudo-Leftist Opportunists, op. cit., p. 2. The Mojahedin's declaration of its positions on the leftist coup in their organization was first drafted in autumn 1976, and completed in the form of a 12-point statement in autumn 1977. Its publication, however, was postponed until spring 1979, due to developments in Iranian society and the participation of the Mojahedin's sympathizers in the general uprising against the Shah. Point 10 of the Mojahedin's declaration reads: "This leftist, opportunist current brought about the premature emergence of a reactionary rightist current, which at this stage is the prime threat to the forces struggling in the name of Islam. We are struggling against this current as well."

14. "162 political prisoners freed," Kayhan, Tehran, 21 January 1979: "The prison courtyard was crowded and overwhelmed with excitement until midnight. The relatives and friends of prisoners, who had impatiently waited all day, chanted, 'Hail to Fadai'i, hail to Mojahed,' and opened their arms to embrace 125 (sic.) of the nation's sincere and freedom-seeking children... To assure the crowd of the freedom of political prisoners, one of the prisoners talked to them directly. The choice was Massoud Rajavi. Facing the enthusiastic overflow of feelings of the public, he said, 'Are there any words with which one could really thank you? Indeed, we owe our freedom to you, and not to any other person or particular group.'"


16. "Massoud Rajavi, a Mojahedin leader: Coup d'etat cannot prevent nation's victory," Kayhan, Tehran, 25 January 1979, p. 4: "Massoud Rajavi, one of the leaders of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, who was freed from prison only a few days ago, spoke at the Tehran University mosque: '... I have not come here to praise this spontaneous trend of events. We have not come to endorse the status quo. We must think about things that need to be accomplished... It should be plainly stated that struggle is the right of any person and any group. If man does not struggle, he is no longer human... Our Islam is not the type that restricts struggle to a special force or group. Did not our leader [Imam Hussein] say, if you do not believe in any religion, at least be free-minded? The sanctity of freedoms and the right to struggle must be safeguarded. The right to struggle is the natural, inherent right of every human being. So we must respect one another and prevent divisiveness. Division is nothing but a reflection of the enemy and its internal agents within our ranks.' See also: Political Positions of the People's Mojahedin of Iran on the Eve of the Revolution's Victory: Speeches of Massoud Rajavi, Tehran, People's Mojahedin of Iran: October 1979.


19. "Mojahedin centers attacked and disarmed," Kayhan, Tehran, 4 March 1979,
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p. 8. See also Mojahed, Special Issue No. 4, 31 January 1980, pp. 366. See also Mojahed, No. 15, 17 December 1979, p. 1, "Mojahedin's statement explaining the recent attacks of the Guards Corps on members and buildings of the Mojahedin."


26. Nashriye Anjomanhaye Daneshjouyan-e Mosalman, No. 10, Paris, 23 October 1981. This and subsequent issues published the names and letters of personalities and groups joining the NCR.


28. “Program of the National Council of Resistance and the Provisional Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran,” Nashriye Anjomanhaye Daneshjouyan-e Mosalman, Paris, 2 October 1981, p.1. In a cover letter dated September 29, 1981, Massoud Rajavi wrote: “I hereby present the program of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran. This program has been accepted by all members of the National Council of Resistance for the Independence and Freedom of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran; henceforth, acceptance of it qualifies one for membership in the NCR.”


30. “Statement of the National Council of Resistance,” Parvaz-e Tarikhaz-e Solh va Azadi (Historic Flight for Peace and Freedom), People’s Mojahedin of Iran: 1986, p. 51. See also pp. 53-121 and page 155 for a report on the events and documents on the circumstances leading to the Iranian Resistance Leader’s departure from France and the regime’s conspiracy to have him extradited.

31. National Liberation Army of Iran, Guarantor of Iranian people’s victory over Khomeini’s dictatorship, Publications Department of the People’s Mojahedin


34. “National Council of Resistance Holds First Parliamentary Session: NCR expands to 235 members, half of whom are women,” Iran Liberation, No. 120, October 1993, p. 1.

35. U.S. State Department, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, 28 October 1994, p. ii.

36. Ibid.


38. Middle East Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2, Spring 1987: The Journal wrote that Peykar “denounced the Islamic orientation of the organization in favor of a Marxist Leninist line and expelled those members who did not adhere to it. The Marxist Leninist faction went so far as to use terrorist methods such as setting fire to Shareef Vageli, a leader of the Islamic faction, in order to gain control of the organization... Advocating armed urban guerrilla operations, in 1975, the Marxist Leninist Mojahedin carried out several terrorist actions, among them the assassination of Col. Turner, Col. Schaefer, and later Gen. Price.”

39. See Appendix E.


42. Mojahed, No. 102, 23 December 1980, p. 2. Interview with Massoud Rajavi: “The hostage-taking was portrayed as the supreme form of struggle against imperialism. Under this pretext, they got rid of many of their opponents and monopolized the elections to the advantage of certain factions.”

43. “What have we gained and what have we learned so far...?”, Mojahed, No. 12, 26 November 1980. The subtitle to this article read: “Success on the field of battle with the primary enemy is possible only when, parallel to it, the internal obstacles to the movement are also dealt with.” In this way, the Mojahedin began alerting the public to the ruling clergy’s motives behind the hostage taking, directing their attention to issues of far greater importance. See also Mojahed, No. 101, 16 December 1980. This and subsequent issues ran a series of articles called “Stories behind the scenes of the hostage-taking.” In an editorial published in Mojahed, No. 106, 20 January 1981, the Mojahedin wrote: “The United States had correctly realized that the hostages have become a complex and difficult issue, more of a problem for Iran than for the U.S.”

44. Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 208-209.

45. Ibid., p. 211.

46. Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Talegani was a veteran activist against the shah
and a highly respected religious leader. His endeavors in defense of the people’s fundamental rights began against the oppressive rule of the shah’s father, Reza Shah, in the 1930s. He was a staunch supporter of Iran’s nationalist leader, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. Between the coup that ousted Mossadeq in August 1953 and the 1979 revolution, Taleqani active in the anti-shah movement, and was arrested and tortured on several occasions by the SAVAK. Soon after the fall of the shah, relations between Taleqani and the ruling mullahs soured. He passed away on September 10, 1979, at the age of 69.

Ayatollah Taleqani, sixth Friday prayer sermon, 7 September 1979, Friday Prayer Sermons of Father Taleqani, People’s Mojahedin of Iran: October 1979, p. 60. In this sermon, Ayatollah Taleqani speaks on the mission of the Prophet of Islam: “He came to break the chains... those laws and traditions which had broken the people’s backs and shackled their minds and movements. The Prophet was sent to eliminate these restrictions and free the people. He had come to free the people... Sometimes these restrictions were imposed on the people under the name of religion, and these were the most dangerous of all, because what was not from God was being attributed to Him.”

“What is the purpose of attacks on revolutionary forces?” Mojahed, No. 5, 20 August 1979: “Everyone knows that the issue is not the building housing the Mojahedin. Those not daring to openly call for repression and restrictions on political freedoms, attack us and make an issue out of a building, claiming that it is public property and the Mojahedin must evacuate it.”

Mojahed, No. 87, 14 June 1980, p. 2.


“Story of Ayatollah Taleqani’s departure from Tehran” and “Ayatollah Taleqani’s sons arrested,” Kayhan, Tehran, 14 April 1979, p. 1.

“People’s Mojahedin put their military forces at Ayatollah Taleqani’s disposal,” Kayhan, Tehran, 16 April 1979, pp.1-2.

Mardom, Tehran, March 1981.

Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 209.

Ibid., p. 215.

CHAPTER VII


2. U.S. State Department, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, 28 October 1994, p. 6.


Notes

15. Ibid., pp. 195-196.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 199.
18. Ibid., pp. 211-213; 216-217.
20. The so-called “Organization of Mojaheds of the Islamic Revolution” was a fascist religious group formed after the downfall of the shah to usurp the name of the Mojahedin, very popular in Iranian society. It was a paramilitary group that consisted of revolutionary guards corps members and generally viewed as a front organization for the hezbollah. They occasionally attacked Mojahedin meetings under the name of hezbollah. After the start of widespread suppression and political executions in Iran, this group became defunct and was officially dissolved. It failed to usurp the Mojahedin name and generated much disgust among the Iranian people.
22. Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the U.N. General Assembly, 10 December 1948.
29. Ibid., p. 6.
30. Ibid., p. iii.
34. Ibid.

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35. "Iranian Terrorism: A Postscript to the Tehran murder machine", British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, August 1994, referring to the regime’s consistent attribution of its terrorist activities to the opposition, the report notes: “In Iran itself, the holiest shrine in the country, the mosque of Imam Reza, in the northeastern city of Mashad suffered a bomb blast on June 20, killing 26 people. Several other attempted bomb attacks were perpetrated on other mosques. It is more than a coincidence that those inside and outside Iran are occurring at locations of some religious sensitivity. These atrocities may be part of a larger campaign, which includes the recent murder of Christian priests. In all these cases, Tehran has blamed the victims or the People’s Mojahedin, their favorite scapegoat at the moment.”


40. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 11.

41. Ibid., p. 13.

42. Ibid.


48. Ibid.


52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.


55. The United States Declaration of Independence, 1776.


Notes

63. Reuters, dispatch from Nicosia, 6 June 1993.
64. Rcssalat, Tehran, 20 July 1987. Mohsen Rafiqdoost, the former Minister of the Pasdaran Corps, admitted that Iran had attacked the Marines’ barracks in Beirut. He said, "The TNT and the ideology that sent 400 marines, officers and soldiers, in the marines’ headquarters to hell was sent from Iran." (See Appendix E.)
65. Statement on Iran, the United States House of Representatives, 8 July 1992.

CHAPTER VIII

4. Joint communiqué issued by the President of the National Council of Resistance of Iran and Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Paris, 9 January 1983.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
23. La Gazette, Val-d’Oise, France, 16 April 1986.
24. Ibid.
27. “Iranian Exile Leaves France Under Pressure,” *The New York Times*, 8 June 1986; also “Iran, France Gain From Iranian Exile’s Exit,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 June 1986, the article states: “French officials say Rajavi left voluntarily and was not expelled, but in recent weeks the French government had exerted quiet pressure and placed restraints on his activities... French editorials expressed the hope Monday that Iran would now press its Islamic fundamentalist supporters in Lebanon to free nine French hostages kidnapped in the past 20 months”; also “Opponents of Khomeini Said to Leave France for Iran-Iraq Border,” *The New York Times*, 10 June 1986, wrote: “Mr. Rajavi’s unexpected departure was seen here as part of an effort to restore normal ties between France and Iran and, ultimately, to help win the release of eight or nine Frenchmen being held hostage by pro-Iranian gunmen in Lebanon.”
29. Reuters, dispatch from Baghdad, 8 June 1986.
32. Ibid.
35. L’Unita, Rome, 18 June 1986; also see statement by the People’s Mojahedin of Iran, 15 June 1986.
37. U.S. State Department, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, 28 October 1994, p. iii.
38. In an editorial in Iraq’s Al-Jumhuriya newspaper, on 20 January 1992, Editor in Chief Saad Al-Bazzaz revealed that throughout the Persian Gulf Crisis, Rafsanjani had encouraged Baghdad to adopt a hard-line stance. Quoting a top Iranian official, he wrote: “I have much more than what you have asked for... We are on your side in the Kuwaiti affair. We request that you not take our official remarks as the only reflection of our stances. We stand beside Iraq and completely understand the circumstances and reasons for Iraq’s position. Do not retreat from Kuwait. We will stand by you against America to the extent our strength allows and as much as we can.” Muhammed Hamzah Az-Zubaidi, then the Iraqi prime minister, reiterated the same point during an interview with the Iraqi national television in January 1992. As the minister of transportation and communications, he was a member of an Iraqi delegation which visited Iran on several occasions during the Persian Gulf crisis.
40. Ibid.
41. Massoud Rajavi, letter to the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, 25 April 1983.
Notes

45. Associated Press, dispatch from Mehran, 21 June 1988. Jeffrey Ulbricht, the AP correspondent, reported from the battle scene that the NLA captured 1,500 Iranian prisoners adding: "Not far away, scores of tanks, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, tons of small arms, machine guns and other equipment were being dumped in a huge holding area." Ulbricht was one of 40 foreign reporters who visited Mehran when the NLA captured the city.
46. Massoud Rajavi, statement by the NCR President, Mojahed, No. 262, 21 September 1985.
47. Kayhan Havai, 17 April 1992. (See Appendix E.)
49. Ulbricht, op. cit.
51. For obvious reasons, then and now, Iran’s other neighbors were politically incapable of hosting the Iranian Resistance’s military forces. The Resistance repeatedly asked the government of Turkey to provide bases and accommodations in Turkey’s border provinces to the Resistance’s combatants, to facilitate their comings and goings to Iran, but Ankara rejected this request. It is now common knowledge that the government of Turkey has impeded the movement of Iranian refugees and engaged in “intelligence and security” cooperation with the Khomeini regime, which seeks only to restrict Iranian refugees and activists. It has even extradited a number of political refugees.
53. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. iii
54. Ibid., p. 10.
56. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 10
58. Statements by the Khomeini regime’s officials on cooperation of the Talebani group against the Mojahedin, 11-12 October 1986. (See Appendix F.)
59. Attacks by Talebani’s group on the Mojahedin in those years include:
   * 22 July 1984: Houshang Abbassi was murdered in his tent while praying in the Kardoveh village;
   * 3 April 1986: A Mojahedin team on a training mission near the Mojahedin’s Mansouri base. Four Mojahedin were wounded;
   * 14 July 1986: Four Mojahedin were attacked and killed on the Kirkuk highway;
   * Winter 1986: The Mojahedin evacuated their bases in the villages of Talteh, Ghasheih, Suneh, Kanaro and Kordaveh. They were blown up to prevent the Khomeini regime from using them;
   * 7 October 1986: Ten Mojahedin were murdered in the village of Posht Asham;
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* 14-15 October 1986: Two Mojahedin bases near the border region in Mavet inside Iraqi territory were shelled with mortar rounds;

* In 1986, on 33 occasions, the Talebani forces stopped the Mojahedin from carrying out their activities. The Talebani group stole five Mojahedin vehicles and on 13 different occasions they robbed the organization’s weaponry and equipment. The Mojahedin did not retaliate in any of the cases.

61. NLA Journal, August 1991; Mojahed, special issue, autumn 1991. (See Appendix F.)
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Massoud Rajavi, addressing a gathering of thousands of NLA combatants on the occasion of Idal-Fitr, 16 April 1991.
65. The two, Samad Emam-qoli and Ja’far Manouchehri, were ambushed on 18 March 1991 and subsequently tortured and executed. (See the report by Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Special Representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, 2 January 1992, P. 14, par. 62.
66. Statement by the Office of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran, Paris, 26 March 1991. The statement said: “Yesterday, a 19-member unit of the NLA lost its way near Jalula and was ambushed by the forces of the regime and the Talebani group near the city of Kelar.” In a second statement on 8 April 1991, the Mojahedin said that of the 19 who were lost, one was killed during the fighting and the rest were captured. All were tortured and executed. Local witnesses said the crime had been perpetrated by Talebani’s forces. At the time, the group’s radio confirmed the capture of the 19 combatants.
68. In his 13 November 1992 interim report to the U.N. General Assembly, p. 9, par. 24, the Special Representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, wrote: “During the second half of April 1992, 45 people were allegedly executed in Tehran. Their bodies were taken to the Mesgarabad cemetery in south Tehran. The names of five of those executed were given as follows: ... Mr. Beshar Shabibi, who was handed over to the Iranian authorities by an Iraqi opposition group, the so-called Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). No reasons were officially given for their execution.”
72. For documents concerning the Khomeini regime’s plans to use local agents to destroy the Mojahedin see Appendix F.
74. Abdol Rahman Qassemilou, Secretary General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, was murdered in Vienna in July 1989 while holding talks with the representatives of the regime. Sadeq Sharafkandi, his successor, was also killed by the Tehran regime’s terrorists in September 1992 in Berlin.
CHAPTER IX

1. U.S. State Department, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, 1994, p. 18.

2. Tahlii-e Amouzeshi-e Rayani-yeh-e Opportunist-hay-e Chapnama, (Educational Analysis of the Statement of pseudo-Leftist Opportunists) People’s Mojahedin of Iran, Tehran: spring 1979, p. 247. The Mojahedins write, “Eventually and historically, it is only the people and the popular forces who judge the good or evil of different political and social positions. In this way, we are equipped with a righteous and genuine criterion which in a historical perspective is the channel for expression of God’s will.”

3. Kayhan, Tehran, 25 January 1979. Only a couple of days after being released from prison, Mr. Rajavi delivered his first public speech at Tehran University. He began in this way, “In the name of God and in the name of the heroic people of Iran. In the name of the martyrs, specially those of the university, the martyrs who granted us freedom. Freedom! Oh dear Freedom! Yes, I said freedom. This is the essence and spirit of human beings. This is what the martyrs sacrificed for, the prisoners were imprisoned for, the exiles immigrated for, and the heroic nation revolted for.”

This was the theme consistently underlined by the Mojahedins in every gathering and every publication, including In the very first issues of Mojahed which began publication in late September 1979. In its sixth issue, Mojahed published an article on the first page entitled, “The Sacred Meaning of Freedom: The Essential Content of Evolution Is None But Freedom and Emancipation.” In yet another famous speech on 12 June, 1980, made on the eve of Khomeini’s banning of Mojahedins’s public activities, Rajavi emphasized, “Freedom is a divine gift to mankind! Nobody has granted it! We have gained it at the price of blood and we will not lose it at the cost of our lives! Anyone who seeks to abrogate the freedom of discussion and criticism, does not comprehend Islam... Anyone who seeks to limit democratic and Islamic freedoms, comprehends neither Islam nor humanity. Freedom is a necessary condition for the perpetuation of human beings in a human state; otherwise, there is nothing to distinguish human kind from the animals. Otherwise, humankind has no means by which it can comprehend duty and responsibility, and the human world can only decline into an animal state...” Mojahed, No. 88, 15 June 1980.


6. Kharajites (seceders) were among the first historical examples of dogmatism and fanaticism in the name of Islam. During the caliphate of Imam Ali, a group of Muslims rebelled, with the motto “la hokmu illa lellah” (these are no verdicts but God’s), forming the anarchist sect of the Kharajites. They are noteworthy because they were the first to advocate a fundamentalist outlook of Islam.

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10. Ibid.
14. Massoud Rajavi interview, in Nashriye Ettehadiye Anjomanhaye Daneshjuyane Mosalman Khareje Keshvar (Journal of the Union of Muslim Iranian Students Societies Outside Iran), Paris, 9 January 1982, p. 1. Here Rajavi is alluding to Imam Ali’s reluctance to accept the leadership of the Muslim community until he was assured of the people’s bei’at (oath of allegiance).
15. Maryam Rajavi, “Pulling the Nation Together: The President-elect underscores common aspirations, will to resist,” The Lion and the Sun, 31 August 1994, p. 24. In a message to the 1994 demonstrations held in 16 cities on the occasion of July 21, to honor restoration of the nationalist premier Mohammad Mossadeq and declare solidarity with the Resistance’s President-elect, Mrs. Rajavi said, “With deep faith in democracy and freedom, and despite the diversity of your political views, culture, beliefs, background and religion, you have come together to say that the sacred value you honor the most is the freedom of Iran and the liberation of Iranians from the disgraceful rule of Khomeini’s mullahs... I invite you all of you to persist in this path, which in the words of the great Mossadeq, does not belong to a special group, but is shared by all the people of Iran.”
16. Mojahed, No. 349, 4 July 1994. The voting sessions and final elections were publicly reported in detail and accompanied with photographs.
22. This choice was broadcast from all of the Mojahedin’s media to inform the Iranian general public.
23. Text of the Mandate officially appointing Maryam Rajavi as the Mojahedin’s Secretary General, 18 October 1989.
25. Ibid. Mrs. Fahimeh Arvani, 33, from Tabriz, joined the Mojahedin in 1979. In 1982, while under surveillance, she left Iran and undertook various responsibilities in different sections of the organization outside Iran. In 1991, she was elected deputy secretary general for two years. In August 1993, following Mrs. Rajavi’s resignation, she was elected Secretary General for two years.
26. The minutes of the meetings, opinion polls, the debates and final voting on the formation of a Leadership Council which took place in the presence of the
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majority of Mojahedin officials and members was reported in Mojahed, broadcast on the Resistance’s radio and television, and distributed on videotapes in Iran and abroad to inform the general public.

27. Full report of these sessions was publicized through the Mojahed’s publications, radio and television.


29. U.S. State Department, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, p. 19.

30. Ibid., p. 3.

31. Ibid., p. 20.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 21.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 22.


40. List of Names and Particulars of 14,028 Victims of the Khomeini Regime’s Executions, compiled by the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, Paris: October 1987.


42. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 30 (75).


44. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 21.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. In addition to several air raids and missile attacks, some other of the regime’s attacks include "assassination of two Mojahedin in Baghdad’s Al-Sha’ab district on 6 October one of whom was killed. Armed attack with Bazooka against the office of the Mojahedin in Baghdad on 19 August 1993, armed attack with Bazooka on a building belonging to the Mojahedin in the city of Baghdad, all of which were reported by the Mojahedin’s press releases and to the UN Secretary General and permanent members of the Security Council.

48. Mohammad Mohaddessin, Nashriyeh-e Anjomanhay-e Daneshjouyan-e Mosalman-e Karej-e Keshvar (News Bulletin of the Union of Muslim Iranian Students outside Iran.

49. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 21.

50. International Committee of the Red Cross, letter to the Mojahedin, 8 May 1994. The letter signed by the ICRC official in Baghdad and the Mojahedin representative, Mr. Farid Soleimani, reads: "During the reiterated visits of the ICRC, the concerned three Iranian detainees had talks in private with ICRC delegates... These different talks took place between ICRC delegates and said three detainees without witness in adequate conditions according to the rule of regular ICRC visits. 

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51. Ibid.
52. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 21.
53. Ibid.
54. As an example one can examine Mojahed, No. 358, 3 October 1994, and Iran Zamin, No. 21, 13 October 1994. See also Iran Zamin, No. 24, 3 November 1994.
55. Article 7 of the disciplinary rules of the National Liberation Army.
56. In the past years, many Iranians have crossed the border and joined the Mojahedin asking them for help to go to another country. There have also been people who joined the NLA and after some time, due to the difficult conditions of the war zone, etc. have asked to leave the ranks of the army and go to Europe. Despite the fact that all volunteers who join the National Liberation Army sign written forms in which they agree that in case they want to leave, the NLA does not accept any responsibility to resolve their problems, the NLA and the Mojahedin have spared no effort, spending large sums, and meeting with the UNHCR representatives in Geneva, Turkey and Iraq as well as with officials of other countries to get help for these people. For example, chairman of the NCR Foreign Affairs Committee has met several times in this regard with the UNHCR in Geneva. The Resistance’s representatives have traveled to Turkey several times and cooperated with the office of the UNHCR to help many of these people. Officials of the majority of European governments can also testify about the efforts of the National Council of Resistance and the Mojahedin.
57. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 20.
58. Ibid.
59. One of these cases is that of Hadi Shams Ha’eri, whom the State Department quotes in its report. He left the ranks of the National Liberation Army, voluntarily, years before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf war. After arriving in Europe, however, he began opposing the resistance and establishing contacts with the mullahs. The article the State Department cites from Iran Times, a Persian language weekly printed in the United States, had been already published in the regime’s official weekly, Kayhan Havai. Subsequently, other newspapers published it in Iran. Ha’eri offered his information about the bases, cadres and conduct of the Mojahedin and the National Liberation Army to the regime. In addition, he revealed the locations of two of the National Liberation Army bases specifying the frequency and arrangements for the visits and residence of the Resistance’s leadership in those bases.
60. Bakhtiar was murdered at his home in August 1991. Fereydoun Boyer Ahmadi, a member of the Guards Corps and an infiltrator, managed to build close contact with Bakhtiar. On the day of the incident, he used this relationship to take to Bakhtiar’s home two other Guards Corps members who had come from Tehran to murder him. The French security guards did not prevent the terrorists from entering because they knew Boyer Ahmadi. Bakhtiar and his aide were murdered and until 48 hours later no body knew of the incident. On 22 November, 1994, the French daily, Liberation wrote: “Boyer Ahmadi, 41, confidant of Bakhtiar, the shah’s former prime minister who was murdered
on August 6, 1991, was an infiltrator who played the role of the Trojan Horse.”


CHAPTER X

1. For documents of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, see Appendix A.
3. Mrs. Nasrin Parsian, an NCR member, was killed in a car accident in the fall of 1993, reducing the total number of Council members to 234, until Summer 1994, when Marzieh, the legendary Iranian singer, joined the Council.
9. Immediate Tasks of the Provisional Government, op. cit.
10. Ibid.
11. Program of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran, 29 September 1981. Also see Massoud Rajavi’s speech, Mojahedin’s perspectives on Constitution and the Government of Imam Ali, People’s Mojahedin of Iran: Tehran, 1979, p. 28. Mr. Rajavi elaborates, “We are not only not opposed to national investment and capitalism at this juncture, but would like to see them strengthened.”
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. Principal tasks of the Transitional Period in the Program of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran.
17. Ibid.
18. The combination of persons who head the 18 NCR committees formed in summer 1993, as the basis of the future provisional government, is a good indicator of the role and share of the various organizations and parties in the Council. Following is a brief on the committee chairs not affiliated with the Mojahedin:
   Chairman of the Athletics Committee, Mr. Moslem Eskandar Filabi, 50, is among Iran’s most renowned wrestling champions and a medal winner in international tournaments.
   Chairman of the Culture and Arts Committee Dr. Manouchehr Hezarkhani,
M.D.; 60 and French educated, is the most renowned Iranian essayist. Chairman of the Denominations and Freedom of Religion Committee Ayatollah Jalal Ganje’i, 51. Educated in Qom and Najaf, Ayatollah Ganje’i was Khomeini’s student in the 1960s. He is the founder of the Association to Defend Iran’s Democracy and Independence (DAD).

Chairman of the Environment Committee, Dr. Karim Qassim, M.D., 48, was one of the leaders of the student movement abroad in the 1960s-70s. He is a surgeon and educated in Germany.

Chairman of the Ethnic Minorities Committee, Mr. Mohamad Reza Rowhani, 52, prominent jurist, member of the National Democratic Front of Iran. Mr. Rowhani was educated in France.

Chairman of the Health Committee, Dr. Saleh Rajavi, 58, a cardiologist and 40-year resident of France, first prize winner of application of electronics in medicine and technology. He headed the Blood Transfusion Center in Paris.

Chairman of the Industries Committee, Mr. Mehdi Samé, 49. A political activist under the shah, Mr. Samé was imprisoned in the final 10 years of the shah’s rule. He is the leader of the People’s Fedayeen Organization.

Chairman of the Judiciary and Human Rights Committee, Mr. Hedayat Matin-Daftari, 61, spokesman of the National Democratic Front of Iran, former Vice President of the Iranian Bar Association. Dr. Matin-Daftari received his education in American and British universities.

Chairman of the Science and Research Committee, Professor Hadi Mahabadi 48, an internationally acclaimed chemist and former dean of the school of chemistry in Sharif University of Technology. A graduate of Waterloo University, Professor Mahabadi has several patented inventions in the field of polymer chemistry. He is a member of the New York Academy of Sciences.

Chairman of the Universities and Higher Education Committee, Dr. Mohammad Ali Sheikhi, 49. Educated in Britain, he was among the senior professors at Tehran University’s School of Technology.

Chairwoman of the Women’s Rights Committee, Mrs. Maryam Matin-Daftari, 55 and British educated, from the National Democratic Front of Iran.

The first public announcement of this undertaking was made in October when all news agencies carried news of the event. Associated Press, 22 October 1993.

NCR article on the rights of the NCR President.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Statement by the Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, Paris, 16 September 1993.

Mohammad Mohaddessin, letter to representatives Ron Dellums and Dan Burton, 13 September 1993.

Constitution of the National Council of Resistance, op. cit.

U.S. Department of State, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, p. 19.

Ibid.

Minutes of the sessions and footage of some of the important decision-makings meetings are available. At the same time, one can take part as an observer in one of the Council’s sessions and examine the methods of discussion,
consultations and voting.

29. Ibid., p. 18.
30. Ibid., p. 19.
31. Ibid., p. 18.
32. Ibid., p. 19.
42. "Meeting of the NCR and discussion of KDP’s negotiations with the regime", Mojahed No. 236, 14 February 1985).
43. See Appendix B.
47. Document on the radio broadcasts for the KDP. (See Appendix B.)
48. See second document on KDP in Appendix B. In another document, the Party’s Ararat Committee thanked the Mojahedin for its "tremendous, unprecedented work in treating and curing the ill and wounded, particularly in terms of paramedic training." Another, one of many of similar content, acknowledges receipt of some 10 million rials ($150,000).
51. The letters are available from the secretariat of the National Council of Resistance, but have not been published to safeguard the security of our Kurdish compatriots.
52. U.S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 18.
53. Ibid., p. 7.
54. Ibid., p. 7.
55. Ibid.
56. Etela’at, Tehran, 24 November 1994; Israeli radio, Farsi service, 24 November 1994. The radio reported, “Ibrahim Yazdi, a prestigious member of Iran’s Freedom Movement led by Mehdi Bazargan, called statements quoted by 24 Hours radio on his behalf, incorrect and said, ‘He and his colleagues are opposed
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to the overthrow of the Islamic rule.' In a letter signed by Ibrahim Yazdi and printed in tonight's issue of Ettela'at, he states that he does not view the overthrow of the present regime in Iran to be in the interests of the people and the country."

57. Mojahed No. 262, 10 October 1985.
58. Political Memoirs of Sanjanbi, p. 419.
59. Ibid., p. 414.
60. For years, the State Department has called the Mojahedin and the Council "undemocratic" but refrained from naming other forces. Recently, however, in addition to the groups named in the report, Ms. Sherman has also named a few groups in her letter to Rep. Torricelli in July 1994. The groups named are Hassan Nazih's Union for Democracy and the United Front for Democracy. These groups too are absent from the Iranian political arena and it seems that only the State Department knows about them. The first group does not even have an address or telephone number. Nazih was the minister of oil in the first Khomeini government. Several years ago he issued a call for the establishment of the Union for Democracy and Progress but it did not materialize and nobody joined it. It was rather an absurd move that was ridiculed in the opposition. If anybody ventures to research into the history of such groups she or he will find that no Iranian actually knows about them and no independent source will confirm their existence.

CHAPTER XI

3. Ibid., p. 199.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Statement issued by Mehdi Bazargan, 6 May 1980.
8. "An official spokesman for the Foreign Ministry told the Iraqi News Agency: The Iranian regime launched a military act of aggression this morning against the Iraqi soil without any reason or excuse... All the world know that the People's Mojahedin and other forces opposed to the Iranian regime are basically in Iran, and their branches outside the country are present in many countries, including Iran's neighboring countries," Iraqi press, 7 November 1994.
11. IRIB, The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, 15 July 1994. It reported, "In the past three weeks, the Islamic Republic's News Agency dispatched more
than 300 news reports and features on the murder of Christian priests, the explosion at Imam Reza’s shrine, and the Mojahedin’s bombing efforts. Dozens of reports were broadcast on the radio and the television. Yet the Western mass media have in a coordinated fashion remained silence.”

12. After two days of censoring the news of the uprising, the state media acknowledged for the first time the role of the Mojahedin and their supporters in organizing and directing the protest. The state television said on 5 July: “Once the Mojahedin tried to exploit the Majlis’ rejection of the bill to make Qazvin a province, the city’s residents poured into the streets to enforce law and order.”

19. In the last days of the shah’s regime, American intelligence reports described the Iranian situation as “not being in the revolutionary nor pre-revolutionary stage.” Iran under the shah was being described as “an Island of stability,” they said.
23. IRNA, dispatch from Tehran, 29 June 1994.
24. IRNA, dispatch from Tehran, 30 June 1994. The matter was extensively discussed in the Commons. MP Corbett asked the Foreign Secretary about government reply to Tehran’s demand. Douglas Hogg, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said: “We have replied that any organisation enjoys freedom of speech in the U.K. as long as it acts within the law.”
25. On the occasion of the traditional festivities of Mehregan, the Resistance’s President-elect sent a message to the Iranian students and teachers, calling on them to voice their opposition to the ruling dictatorship and celebrate Mehregan in an act of protest to the regime’s banning of all ancient Persian traditions. Resistance’s supporters staged activities in 57 cities nationwide.
27. Ibid.
28. In a press conference at the British House of Commons, Messrs. Anthony
Coombs and Win Griffiths, along with Mr. Mohammad Mohaddessin, the NCR Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, announced the joint support of 1,500 parliamentarians for the National Council of Resistance. Mr. Coombs said in the conference that the NCR is widely recognized as the regime’s de facto alternative. *Iran Liberation*, No. 116, August 1992; BBC, Farsi service, 14 July 1992.

29. “House members urged the Bush administration yesterday to support the main exile opposition group that is seeking to overthrow Iran’s Islamic fundamentalist government,” wrote the *Washington Times*, 9 July 1992. A day earlier, Associated Press carried a report saying, “U.S. lawmakers see the National Council of Resistance ‘as capable of establishing democracy in Iran.’”


31. In their letter on 20 October 1994, sixty-three members of the British houses of Lords and Commons wrote to President Clinton and encouraged him to “take steps towards opening dialogue with representatives of the National Council of Resistance of Iran and the People’s Mojahedin.” They explained, “We, like our colleagues in the U.S. House and Senate, believe any practical and effective measure should be accompanied by an exchange of views with the Iranian Resistance and its representative. It is our own experience that meeting with them has always been a constructive move.” (See Appendix C.)

CHAPTER XII

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 7.
5. Ibid., p. 19.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 7.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 21.
16. Ibid.
18. Mohsen Milani, *The making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to
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19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 119.
28. See chapter IX about one of these individuals, Hadi Shams Ha’eri. The State Department refers to him as a former member of the Mojahedin.
30. U.S. State Department, op. cit., p. 2.
31. Ibid., p. 18.
35. Ibid.
37. Haji Hassan Qarajeh-Daghi, popularly known as Sattar-Khan, was a leader of the constitutional movement of 1906 against the Qajar Dynasty. From the northwestern city of Tabriz. Sattar-Khan defeated the siege of the Czarist and pro-monarchy forces in Azerbaijan province and later on attacked Tehran and toppled the government of the Qajar Monarch, Mohammad Ali shah. After the victory of the Constitutional movement, leaders of the Old Guard usurped the leadership and conspired to disarm Sattar-Khan and his fighters, known as the Mojahedin. In the ensuing battles, Sattar-Khan was wounded. He passed away several years later in 1913. Mohammad Mo’in, A Persian Dictionary, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications), fourth ed., vol. 5, p. 733.
38. Mirza Younis bin Mirza Bozorg, known as the Mirza Kuchek Khan Jangali, was originally a clergyman. He founded an association of the clergy, vowing to stop foreign domination over Iran. He played a very important role in the victory of the Constitutional movement and later on liberated the entire province of Gilan and declared a republic. After the coup in 1920 that brought Reza Shah to power, government forces attacked his bases in the jungles of Gilan. He eventually died in 1921 after getting caught in a snow storm. A government soldier, cut his throat and took his head to Reza Shah. Mohammad Mo’in, A Persian Dictionary, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publications), fourth ed., vol. 6, p. 1619.