

NLA Crushes Offensives by the Regimes Gaurds

As the Gulf War ended, the mullahs ruling Iran suddenly did an aboutface in a bid to take advantage of the prevailing circumstances. Under the pretext of an “Islamic Revolution in Iraq,” they sought to realize Khomeini’s dream of exporting medieval fundamentalism and seizing power in Iraq, and at the same time destroy Iranian Resistance’s military arm, the National Liberation Army of Iran. Frustrating the Khomeini regime’s designs, the NLA crushed all the attacks, from March 10 to April 2, by the regime’s 25,000 invading forces. NLA units dealt the enemy a heavy military blow in a series of operations code-named Pearl after the Morvarid mountains where they took place. The regime’s offensive was a fiasco and drew statements of concern by the international community.



Initial Evidence as Plot Takes Shape

On March 11, the People’s Mojahedin of Iran released a statement warning that documents obtained from within the Khomeini regime, intercepted Guards Corps radio communications, and Arrows show Gaurds Corps’ main thrust against NLA mander-in-Chief and Commander of the operation to

occupy Iraq; and Ahmad Vahidi, Head of intelligence for the GC General Command and Commander of the extra-territorial or Qods Force, were headquartered at Ramazan Garrison in Kermanshah. Morteza Qorbani, Commander of Najaf Garrison, also located in Kermanshah, was in charge of logistics for the offensive. Troops and supplies for the regime's forces inside Iraqi territory were being sent from Najaf Garrison. Rewrite, a sentence or two may be missing.



In the Khosravi border region, heliboard operations to take the regime's agents inside Iraqi territory had been observed. Some forces had set up tactical bases on both sides of the border, for example, in the Khorram shahr-Tanouma region and on the Khosravi-Mehran operational axis.

On Rafsanjani's personal orders, Ramazan Garrison had received two-months' food rations for 25,000 people to pursue the operations in Iraq. Mullahs dispatched by the *Velayat-Faqih* (Khamenei) appeared from Basra all the way to northern Iraq. The Friday Prayer leader of Ahwaz, for example, traveled several times to the city of Tanouma near Basra in Iraq.

The Khomeini regime's special radio and television broadcasts in Arabic also signaled the regime's criminal intentions of expansionism.

First Offensive

The Khomeini regime's first attack began at noon on Sunday, March 10, from the east and west and subsequently from the south and north on a large NLA camp called Fort Hanif. The objective was to surround and cut off the Iranian Resistance's forces stationed there. The Khomeini regime also planned to simultaneously penetrate the city of Khalis (69 kms north of Baghdad) in Diyala Province and lay siege to another NLA camp nearby.



Fort Hanif, with an area of approximately 1,000 square kilometers, is situated 60 kms from the Iranian border, opposite the western Iranian province of Kermanshah.

Originally a vast piece of desert and rolling hills, the fort had been used as a military training ground for the National Liberation Army of Iran since 1987. Many buildings and other installations were built there by the Mojahedin.

In a series of clashes, NLA combatants first took control of all roads west of Fort Hanif.

NLA units then fortified their positions and routed the enemy east of the town of Sulaymanbek (193 kms north of Baghdad), cutting enemy supply lines. Clashes subsequently intensified.

First Offensive Part 2

On March 13, two flights landed at Ramazan Garrison in Kermanshah. Rafsanjani, accompanied by the Head of Khamenei's Office, Mohammad-Ali Golpayegan, and a large number of GC commanders, had come to personally oversee the operation to occupy Iraqi soil and attack NLA bases.

At 9:30 am on Thursday, March 14, after four days of fighting, combatants of the National Liberation Army of Iran crushed the Khomeini regime's conspiracy to encircle Fort Hanif. In the early hours of that morning, NLA units left Fort Hanif and advanced toward enemy positions.

Around mid-day on Friday, March 15, several units took up positions around the town of Jalula, 30 kms from the Iran-Iraq border, in continuation of their 24-hour advance. Fighting continued to rage at the entrance to the town of Kifri. The mullahs' agents deployed a large number of Katyusha multiplerocket launchers and various types of mortars. Five Mojahedin combatants were slain in these clashes and 20 more wounded. The enemy's losses are estimated at more than 500.

The regime's agents constantly radioed their



command headquarters in the west Iranian town of Saqqez for help and reinforcements. Rafsanjani forbade any announcements of the names of those killed to prevent revelation of regime's intervention in Iraq.

Assessment of Defeat and second attack

Rafsanjani returned to Tehran on March 16. Immediately after his arrival, the Supreme National Security Council convened. The session, chaired by Rafsanjani and attended by top military commanders, evaluated the blow the Guards Corps had received from the NLA and discussed various means of sending more forces and supplies into Iraqi territory. Tehran radio announced that the SNSC had called the meeting "to review the latest developments in the crisis in Iraq."

From then on, the Khomeini regime tried to concentrate its forces; the Guards Corps' 32nd Ansar-al-Hossein, 39th Nabi Akram, 80th Balal and 59th Muslim-bin-Aqil Brigades were transferred to the Qaleh-Shahin camp south of Sarpol-Zahab (30 kms from the border). The GC's 212th Hamzeh Brigade was stationed on the Paveh-Newsud axis. The 11th Amir-al-Momenin and Hamzeh Brigades from the 9th Badr Division entered Iraq in a centralized fashion from the Mehran operational axis.

Reconnaissance units from all of these brigades, accompanied by GC Intelligence and Operations officers from Ramazan Garrison, also entered Iraq. The GC's Sa'egheh Garrison which runs Air Force and other air operations, was re-opened in Kermanshah.

Three 747 planes shuttled back and forth ferrying troops to enemy bases. GC Air Force Operations Commander Khatami went to Tehran for new orders and necessary coordination.

Assessment of Defeat and Second Attack Part 2

From March 16 to 24, the Khanaqin, Jalula-Kifri region was the scene of fierce fighting between the Khomeini regime's Guards and NLA combatants.

One intense battle raged at the entrance to the town of Kifri from March 17 to 20. According to eyewitness reports and other reliable information, 50 vehicles carrying members of the Guards Corps entered the Kelar region. In preparation for an attack on NLA positions, a major portion of them moved into Kifri. The Guards took up positions at the customs center, police station and other government office buildings, and opened heavy artillery fire on the NLA forces. On March 20, NLA forces foiled their operational plan, inflicting at least 130 casualties on the Guards and forcing them to retreat from their positions. There were no casualties on the NLA side.



Large-scale Operation Pearl

In response to the Khomeini regime's wide-ranging conspiracy and attacks on the NLA's positions north of Jalula and Khanaqin, NLA forces launched a counterattack at 5 a.m. on Monday, March 25. The offensive took place in the general area of Kifri, Qareh-Tappeh - Jalula and Khanaqin along a strip 150 kms long and 50 kms deep on nine axes. At 6 a.m. two other NLA units joined the operation on two additional axes.

At 10 a.m., having routed thousands of Guards, the NLA forces successfully reached their objectives

on all 11 axes.

Enemy forces north of Khanaqin (4 kms from the border) and Jalula, south of Kifri and Kelar (20 kms from the border) and east of Qareh-Tappeh were routed and their centers destroyed.

In the Operation Pearl, the Aqdagh-Saghir Heights (5 kms from the Iranian border and north of Khanaqin), all the strategic Morvarid Heights (10 kms from the Iranian border and north-east of



Jalula) and all the Jobbeh-Daq Height (northwest of Jalula) were taken and the enemy's fortifications overrun. The area east and west of the Diyala River and the areas south and north of the Alvand River were also captured, as well as the positions where the regime's agents were concentrated.

As a result of the Operation Pearl, the Iranian-Resistance's forces had secured their positions from attack and enemy artillery fire. After 16 days of battle, the NLA had taken control of nearly 450 kms of enemy crossings and supply routes spread over an area of 8,000 sq. kms.

The medieval dictatorship ruling Iran had been dealt a fundamental and strategic setback. Nineteen Mojahedin combatants were slain in the Operation Pearl. The Khomeini regime's Guards and agents left a large number of wireless radios, RPG-7 grenade launchers and other arms and ammunition bearing the "Islamic Republic" emblem behind on the battlefield.

Post-Pearl Clashes

Following the defensive Pearl Operation on March 25, a unit of the National Liberation Army of Iran positioned on the Aqdagh-Saghir Heights was attacked by Khomeini's Guards positioned on the heights north of the village of Khalifa-Morad (20 kms north of Khanaqin). Another NLA unit advanced on Khalifa-Morad Village, routing a large number of uniformed Guards in heavily fortified bunkers and killing or wounding at least 100 of them. A large fuel storage warehouse, a depot of Sagger rockets and two large ammunition dumps were completely leveled and destroyed. In the course of this operation, the NLA combatants seized a number of the Guards' ID cards bearing the Guards Corps stamp, as well as weapons and equipment marked with the Guards Corps emblem. Documents and evidence obtained from this region indicated the large scope of the mullahs' plan to suppress the Iranian Resistance.

At 2 p.m. on March 26, units of the National Liberation Army of Iran in the village of Kolejou (north of Jalula) were attacked by the Khomeini regime's Guards Corps and local agents. The NLA combatants responded with heavy fire and after five hours of fighting, routed the Guards, killing at least 200 as the rest fled. In this clash two Mojahedin combatants were slain and ten



wounded, only one of them seriously.

Between March 29 and 31, scattered but intense clashes erupted between NLA combatants and the regime's Guards. Eight Guards were killed and five taken captive. A number of these Guards had deliberately worn the traditional loose local dress over their Guards Corps uniforms and some were carrying "Islamic Jihad" ID cards.

Last Attempt from Qasr-e Shirin

Beginning at 1:30 a.m. local time on April 1, thousands of the Khomeini regime's Guards in the border region of Qasr-e Shirin launched a major four-pronged offensive. Using light and heavy weaponry, including heavy tanks and armored personnel carriers, they attacked positions of the National Liberation Army of Iran on the Morvarid (pearl) Heights, Aqdagh-Saghir Heights and north of Khanaqin. The offensive was directed from Ramazan



Garrison by the Guards Corps Commander-in-Chief, Mohsen Reza'i.

At the outset of the Guards Corps' offensive, NLA combatants countered, blocking the route of the Guards' advance. On the Aqdagh-Saghir Heights alone, 300 Guards were killed and a large amount of equipment left on the battlefield.

This offensive, carried out by the 32nd Ansar-al-Hosseini, 39th Nabi Akram, 59th Muslim-bin-Aqil and 100th Ansar-al-Rasoul Brigades was repelled after an 18-hour battle. At least 1,500 Guards were killed and six captured by the NLA units. According to these captives, several GC battalions were

completely destroyed in these clashes and dozens of their vehicles demolished. Many of the enemy dead had GC ID cards.

In the course of this battle, 10 NLA combatants were killed and 17 wounded, three seriously. On April 2, NLA units captured two critical heights north of Khanaqin used by the Khomeini regime's Guards to shell and launch attacks against NLA positions.

Future Belongs to Resistance

After a month of fighting, the National Liberation Army of Iran foiled the Khomeini regime's plot and repelled all enemy forces, while because of the geography of the battlefield, only 20% of the NLA forces had been deployed for the fighting. In the Operation Pearl, the National Liberation Army of Iran again demonstrated its military might and proficiency, combat capability and fire power. The operation dealt a significant military setback to the regime's devastated war machine.

Yet beyond the military aspect, the defeat was both fundamental and strategic because of its political repercussions in the balance of power between the Iranian Resistance and the Khomeini regime on the regional and international levels.

The Khomeini regime supposedly had an ideal regional and international situation in which to



destroy the National Liberation Army. The political implications of its decisive defeat enhanced the status of the Mojahedin and the NLA, adding to the international credibility of the Iranian Resistance as the powerful alternative to the faltering Khomeini regime.

The NLAs victory in the major Pearl operation made it plain that any investment in the future of the Khomeini regime will bring only loss. Until a democratic regime governs in Iran, peace, stability and good neighborly relations in the region are inconceivable.



Gaurds Casualties

An estimated seven to ten thousand of the Khomeini regime's various forces were routed in the Operation pearl. Several Guards Corps (GC) units were completely destroyed or lost their combat capabilities, as over 5,000 Guards were killed. The 59th Muslim-bin-Aqil Brigade, one of the key units dispatched to Iraq, was practically destroyed. The GC Command withdrew what was left of this brigade's troops from the battlefield and replaced them with the

100th Ansar-al-Rasoul Brigade.

There is information from inside Iran that the Guards Corps sent a confidential note on March 19 to the Office of Khamenei, Commander-in-Chief of the regime's Armed Forces. The note contained a list of 86 Guards killed in clashes with the Mojahedin, with a postscript that an updated list would be sent after identification was completed and a final list prepared. The note mentioned that the

casualties pertained to the GC 59th Muslim-bin-Aqil and 39th Nabi-Akram Brigades.

The Guards Corps' casualties were so heavy that the Khomeini regime was compelled to reinstate the systems used during the Iran-Iraq war to evacuate and transfer dead and wounded. These systems had been inoperative since the 1988 ceasefire. The regime also readied special locations and hospitals for the wounded in Tehran, Oroumieh (northwest Iran), Kermanshah (west) and Ahwaz (southwest).

Gaurds Casualties Part 2

On March 23 and 24, the corpses of 150 Guards killed on Iraqi soil were transferred to Tehran via the western and southwestern borders. The large number of the dead prohibited the regime from identifying them before burial.

The corpses were filmed for later identification. In just one day, the GC Command in Kermanshah sent 3,000 coffins to Qasr-e Shirin. Such figures do not include the large number of Guards' corpses left in Iraq.

The Khomeini regime attempted to prevent news about the Guards Corps' heavy casualties from leaking out. The Guards Corps did not even allow visits to the wounded by their families. Despite such strict censorship, the



Mojahedin announced the names of 150 GC commanders and members killed by March 20 in attacks on the Iranian Resistance's bases.

Information from Iran indicated that the naval unit commander of the Guards Corps' 39th Nabi-Akram Brigade, Haj Hamed Yaqubinejad, and seven more commanders were killed in attacks on NLA bases. On May 5, the Khomeini regime declared a day of mourning in the city of Kermanshah and held a memorial service for the large number of Guards from the 39th Brigade killed over a month before in clashes with the NLA.

Documents Reveal Regime's Designs in Iraq

Disclosure of the Khomeini regime's incursion into Iraqi territory-aimed at suppressing the forces of the Iranian people's just Resistance and exporting the mullahs' medieval fundamentalism-contradicted its opportunistic political objectives, both domestically and internationally. Therefore, the mullahs went to great lengths to ensure their denial of meddling in Iraqi affairs.

Guards captured by the NLA in the Operation Pearl said the Khomeini regime had assigned several battalions the task of returning the Guards' corpses to Iran so that no trace of them would be left on Iraqi soil. The captives also said



Rafsanjani had personally ordered that the regime's dead not be returned to their families. Their death certificates were to cite "disarming minefield" or the like as the circumstances of their deaths. Meanwhile, the Khomeini regime persistently denied its involvement in Iraq.

These false claims coincided with the last attempt by thousands of the Khomeini regime's Guards to attack the NLA's defense lines from Qasr-e Shirin. The Khomeini regime had suffered a major defeat, leaving 1,500 dead and a large amount of arms and ammunition with GC markings on Iraqi soil. Citing this irrefutable evidence, the People's Mojahedin of Iran repeated its appeal to international organizations to condemn the Khomeini regime's extensive military interference in Iraq to suppress the Iranian Resistance.

The Mojahedin also repeated its call on the United Nations to send a delegation to the Khanaqin - asr-Shirin region. On April 12, a month after the interference had begun, the mullahs' President, Rafsanjani, vented his anger in a Tehran Friday prayers sermon at the international media's extensive coverage of the Mojahedin's revelations. He also admitted his regime's involvement in Iraq: "It's not our responsibility to safeguard our 1,300-km border with Iraq... It is possible that some people did go... to the other side, do some things and come back."